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ABSTRACT This paper follows a quasi-experimental research design to assess the impact of the electronic payment
system of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme. The switch from cash payments to
electronic payments delivered via savings accounts is found to have medium-term effects on savings decisions,
transaction costs, and coping strategies. Overall, the study finds that, following the intervention, a substitution effect
emerged between saving portfolio choices, with the poor favouring bank accounts over informal saving arrange-
ments. It also found that the Oportunidades savings account led to an increase in remittance reception, which in turn
had important implications for household consumption smoothing and risk management decisions. The study also
reveals impact heterogeneity depending on household composition and the rural-urban divide, with important
implications for replicability of similar policy innovations in other countries.
1. Introduction
Social service delivery for the poor remains a major challenge for development effectiveness.
While public-private alliances can represent a viable solution to improve the efficacy of social
services, rigorous evidence of their impact is scarce. It is all the more important to fill into this gap
given that at the moment several cash transfer programmes around the world are currently in a
transition from cash to electronic payments. Our study contributes to the literature on conditional
cash transfer programmes and financial inclusion by examining the impact of a recent electronic
payment system introduced by the Mexican government to distribute Progresa-Oportunidades-
Prospera programme.
Progresa, which was renamed as Oportunidades in 2001 and then as Prospera in 2010 (referred
hereafter to as POP) is Mexico’s flagship antipoverty social assistance programme, with the aim of
breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty by enhancing human development through investment
in education, health, and nutrition. POP provides income support to poor families in exchange for
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regular school attendance of children and periodic health check-ups of household members (Niño-
Zarazúa, 2011). POP was launched in August 1997 to cover 300,700 households in 6,344 rural
municipalities. By the end of 2015, the programme supported 6.1 million households living in
poverty, 25 per cent of Mexico’s population.
POP’s income support was initially paid in cash at distribution points located in towns, which
entailed long travelling and queuing times for many recipient households. The repercussions were
also in terms of opportunity costs for leaving productive activities unattended, and personal
safety, as recipients carrying cash were exposed to the risk of theft and assault (Klein &
Mayer, 2011). In 2003, the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI), a state-
owned development bank, entered a partnership with a network of non-banking institutions
known as L@ Red de la Gente (People’s Network) that includes credit unions, savings and credit
associations (SCAs), savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs), and microfinance institutions.
They began, together with POP’s National Co-ordination Unit, a pilot phase to deliver POP’s
grants in savings accounts.
The fact that BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente targeted communities where POP also operated
provided the opportunity to introduce the pilot phase. In 2009, Visa debit cards were issued to pilot
beneficiaries who had already been receiving the grant in savings accounts. Pre-paid cards were also
distributed, especially among the rural poor who lived in localities with limited banking infrastruc-
ture. By 2011, all POP recipients throughout the country received their transfer in savings accounts
with debit or prepaid cards (see Figure 1).
This study examines the treatment effect of the pilot phase transition from cash to electronic
payments in savings accounts. We take advantage of the availability of a rich household-level survey,
the BANSEFI-SAGARPA Panel Survey 2004–2007, collected by BANSEFI and the Secretariat of
Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA). The survey coincided
with the phasing-in of the electronic payment programme, which allowed us to construct a quasi-
experimental evaluation design. More precisely, we exploit as an exogenous rule the fact that the
selection of participation in the electronic transfer programme was made by the managers of L@ Red
de la Gente and POP, and not the households themselves. This allowed us to rule out any potential
Figure 1. Phase-in and roll-out of Oportunidades electronic payment system.
Source: Authors, with data from Oportunidades (2012).
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endogeneity problem due to household self-selection. However, since the selection into treatment was
not random, and most likely influenced by the availability of financial infrastructure in localities
treated by POP, we exploit the variation in observed heterogeneity to compute average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) matching estimators.
The literature on the topic is scant and can be grouped into two strands: the first focuses on the
effects of access to savings accounts with preferential conditions, including no opening or minimum
balance fees, and minimum transaction costs to the poor (Prina, 2015, Aportela, 1999; Brune, Giné,
Goldberg, & Yang, 2016; Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Dupas & Robinson, 2013; Dupas, Green, Keats, &
Robinson, 2016). The second branch of the literature examines the transition from cash to electronic
payments of cash transfer programmes (Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, & Tierney, 2016; Bachas,
Gertler, Higgins, & Seira, 2017; Chiapa & Prina, 2014,; Seira, 2010). In the particular context of
Mexico, Seira (2010) and Chiapa and Prina (2017) examined financial transactions and the propensity
to save among a limited sample of POP’s beneficiaries that received payments in savings accounts.
More recently, Bachas et al. (2017) examined the second phase of POP’s payment system, that is the
rollout of debit cards to pilot electronic payment beneficiaries.
Our study focuses specifically on the initial phase, that is the transition from cash payments to
electronic payments in savings accounts. This is relevant as the transition from cash payments to
savings accounts represented, for a significant proportion of POP beneficiaries, the first direct
encounter with formal financial services. More specifically, we analyse the four-year, medium-term
effect of POP’s electronic payments on savings decisions, transaction costs, and coping strategies
against idiosyncratic risks. Our analysis also identifies the possible medium-term underlying mechan-
isms through which better access to financial services can have add-on effects on beneficiaries of
cash transfer programmes.
The results indicate that households who received their cash transfer in a BANSEFI savings account
decreased their participation in some forms of informal saving arrangements, faced less constrains on
remittance reception, and as a result, were less likely to reduce consumption or contract loans to cope with
idiosyncratic shocks.We also find a degree of outcome heterogeneity, which seems to be contingent upon the
environments that characterise rural and urban areas inMexico.1 Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the
certainty created for the poor by regular income transfers from POP and the incentive mechanisms that the
intervention generated, played an important role. It also highlights that the scale and type of financial
institutions behind the reform matters: these were in fact smaller entities which attracted more trust on the
part of beneficiaries, requested no opening or maintenance fees, and were muchmore densely distributed on
the territory than formal commercial banks.
Overall, our study shows that cash transfers, in addition to their intended social impacts, can
contribute to improve financial inclusion and risk management portfolios of the poor. An important
policy conclusion of our study is that, for cash transfer programmes to effectively facilitate financial
inclusion, extending financial access per se is not enough. Providing incentives to get people to use a
broader spectrum of financial services is also key. The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and outlines the theoretical background; Section 3 provides a
discussion on the context in which the pilot of the electronic payment system of POP was introduced;
Sections 4 and 5 provide information on the data, identification strategy, and the estimation methods.
Section 6 presents the results, while Section 7 concludes with some reflections on policy.
2. Literature review
The importance of financial inclusion for poverty reduction has long been highlighted in the
Economics literature (Burgess & Pande, 2005; Deaton, 1990; Demirgüç-Kunt, Thorsten, &
Honohan, 2008; Giné & Townsend, 2004; Karlan & Morduch, 2009). Several studies discuss the
unconventional forms of savings by the poor and the need for taking them into account when
financial inclusion interventions are designed and implemented. For example, Deaton (1990) has
pointed out that consumption-smoothing and insurance motives are common reasons behind savings
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decisions by the poor. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper (2013) highlight
the importance of having access to financial services such as payments and transfers instruments
linked to remittances, despite the fact that nearly 80 per cent of the global poor remain unbanked.
Over the past 15 years, cash transfer programmes have become one of the most prominent policy
instruments against poverty and vulnerability in low- and middle-income countries. About 100 cash
transfer programmes in more than 60 countries currently reach 190 million low-income households
worldwide (Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa, 2011). Given the scale and transfer volume of many of these
programmes, there has been a growing interest in making cash payments more efficient and
financially inclusive, and in recent times, several cash transfer programmes have begun a transition
to deliver cash benefits through electronic payments in savings accounts or prepaid cards.2
While the literature on financial inclusion is vast and expanding, the scholarly work closely related
to our study remains limited and broadly divided into two strands of literature: the first group of
studies examine the effects of being exposed to savings accounts offered with no opening or
minimum balance fees and which minimise transaction costs for the poor. A significant contribution
in this area is the field experiment in Nepal by Prina (2015), which reports that access to savings
accounts with zero fees and in close proximity to households led to high take-up rates and use of
savings among female household heads, which also improved their ability to cope with income
shocks. She found no evidence of crowding out effects of savings accounts on non-monetary assets,
liabilities, and monetary assets, including informal savings such as in ROSCAs. In Kenya, Jack and
Suri (2014) found that the mobile-based transaction system M-PESA considerably reduced users’
transaction costs, which in turn improved consumption smoothing against income shocks through
increases in amount, and diversity of sources, of remittances. Klein and Mayer (2011) also found that
the M-PESA mobile money system cut transaction and opportunity costs, especially for the poor,
while also increasing their exposure to financial innovations.
In the context of Mexico, Aportela (1999) examined a natural experiment involving the opening of
new branches of National Savings Trust Fund (PAHNAL) – a state-owned savings bank – in post
offices. He found that improved accessibility to PAHNAL led to higher levels of savings, especially
among low-income households. However, as in Prina (2015), he did not find evidence of a substitu-
tion effect between savings accounts and various forms of informal savings. Other relevant studies
that highlight the positive effects of accessible low-cost savings accounts are Brune et al. (2016),
Banerjee and Duflo (2011), Dupas and Robinson (2013), and Dupas et al. (2016).3
The second strand of literature examines cash transfer programmes’ transition to electronic
payments. These studies generally find positive demand-side effects with the reduction of risk factors
associated to carrying cash and lower transaction costs for recipient households; especially in relation
to travel, transportation costs, and waiting times. In Niger, for instance, Aker et al. (2016) found
evidence of higher diet diversity among households receiving a cash transfer programme distributed
through mobile money technology, which was partially attributed to time savings associated with
lower travel and waiting time.
More closely related to our study are Seira’s (2010), and Chiapa and Prina’s (2014) studies of the
transaction flows related to POP’s electronic payment system, and the more recent study by Bachas et
al. (2017) that examined the rollout of Visa debit cards among POP’s urban beneficiaries. Seira’s
transaction flow data was recorded only for the subset of beneficiaries who already received
payments through savings accounts, whereas Chiapa and Prina’s (2014) study focused on POP’s
beneficiaries living in urban and peri-urban areas. Both studies show that a fraction of the banked
poor did not withdraw the whole sum corresponding to their POP grant and saved part of it in their
saving account, suggesting that low income households do save when appropriate financial instru-
ments are available to them. These results are in line with the earlier findings by Gertler, Martinez,
and Rubio-Codina (2012), who reported that beneficiaries of POP saved about a tenth of their grant
for investment, which led to increases in consumption in the medium-term. Interestingly, Bachas et
al.’s (2017) study reports that having debit cards, in addition to a savings account, enabled POP
beneficiaries to reduce the transaction costs of accessing their savings, and also the monitoring costs
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of checking account balances. As a result, the number of POP beneficiaries that held positive saving
balances increased from 13 per cent to 87 per cent in two years. The proportional increase in savings
corresponded to a reduction in consumption of similar magnitude, and was not due to crowding out
other forms of saving.
Of particular interest for our study is the fact that electronic payments of cash transfer programmes
often represent the first entry point for the poor into the financial system. Regular visits to the
branches belonging to BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente exposed the poor to other financial
services that can widen their risk management and investment portfolios. Remittances are distinctly
important in the context of Mexico, where they act as an insurance mechanism that protects house-
hold consumption against income shocks (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006, Skoufias & Quisumbing,
2005).4 Recent studies, notably Jack and Suri (2014) and Blumenstock, Eagle, and Fafchamps (2016),
presented remittances as one key underlying mechanism explaining why access to electronic pay-
ments can help the poor to smooth consumption. The study by Arestoff and Venet (2011) supports
this line of argument too. They analysed the introduction of ‘Orange-money’ in Madagascar, which
provided mobile-based deposit and transfer services, and found a sizable effect on the frequency of
remittances. Our study also highlights the role of remittances as a key transmission mechanism
through which electronic payments of cash transfer programmes can contribute to widening portfolio
choices for risk management by the poor.
3. Context and intervention
POP is the largest nation-wide antipoverty policy in Mexico, currently reaching 28.1 million people or a
fourth of Mexico’s population. POP’s income support is distributed every two months and is primarily
given to women. The monthly average transfer size is about 130 USD, or 20 per cent of households’
labour income among the targeted population, this can vary depending on household composition
(ECLAC, 2016). The fact that POP provides regular and predictable income support to beneficiaries is
critical to understanding consumption smoothing, risk management, and savings decisions made by the
poor (Angelucci & Attanasio, 2009, Gertler et al., 2012, Hoddinott & Skoufias, 2004).
POP’s income support was initially paid in cash at distribution points located in towns. This
usually entailed long travelling and queuing times for recipient households. The repercussions were
also in terms of opportunity cost for leaving their economic activities unattended, as well as
endangered personal safety, as collectors carrying cash were exposed to the risk of theft and assault
(Klein & Mayer, 2011). In 2001, the Mexican Congress passed a new law – Ley de Ahorro y Crédito
Popular – as part of a wider reform of the financial system, with the aim of transforming non-banking
financial institutions into fully regulated and monitored entities, legally authorised to receive depos-
its. The law also transformed the National Savings Trust Fund (PAHNAL) into a development bank,
the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) with the mandate of deepening
financial intermediation and inclusion among low-income households (Niño-Zarazúa, 2009).
A census conducted by BANSEFI in 2002 found that the non-banking sector – composed of about
630 institutions – had a market penetration rate of only 17 per cent (Gavito, 2002).5 Data on financial
inclusion collected in 2006 by the National Banking and Securities Commission showed that
financial penetration in rural and peri-urban communities still remained very limited. Financial
inclusion rates were slightly higher in the urban sector, with just 26 per cent of urban households
being banked (Honohnan, 2008). This was in line with early findings by Caskey, Ruiz Duran, and
Solo (2006), who reported that only 24 per cent of households in Mexico City had access to formal
financial services provided by either banking or non-banking institutions.
The initial pilot phase of the electronic payment system analysed in this study is the result of a joint
effort that began in 2003 by the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL), POP’s National Co-
ordination Unit, BANSEFI and non-banking institutions affiliated to L@ Red de la Gente. Two
central objectives guided the policy: first, to make the delivery of POP more efficient, by cutting
transaction and opportunity costs to beneficiary households, and second, to broaden the limited
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financial inclusion in the country. The pilot intervention involved the opening of savings accounts for
POP beneficiaries in nearby branches belonging to BANSEFI and non-banking institutions that
formed part of L@ Red de la Gente (hereafter referred to as programme branches). All these savings
accounts were qualitatively similar: free of opening and maintenance fees, they did not require a
minimum savings balance, and most importantly, they provided a considerable proportion of POP
beneficiaries with access to formal financial services for the first time.6
The accounts also function as any other savings account: POP beneficiaries could withdraw the full
amount of their grant or keep part as savings. They could also receive deposits from other sources,
including remittances. Remittance services offered by BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente are
particularly attractive as they represent the cheapest option on the market. Both institutions charge
very similar fees as the result of a partnership with a group of remittance companies operating in the
United States (see Table 1).
The intervention design meant that transactions and opportunity costs of receiving POP’s grant
were reduced for treated households. Indeed, Seira (2010) finds that opportunity and financial costs
associated with the collection of POP decreased by 77 per cent and 98.5 per cent, respectively.7
Equally important is the fact that, by distributing POP regularly in the BANSEFI savings accounts,
the grant served as an incentive device that increased the exposure of poor households to financial
services. In fact, POP beneficiaries had to visit programme branches at least fortnightly to collect
their grant; by doing so, they were exposed to information about all financial services offered by the
BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente.
During the pilot phase, more than 90 per cent of POP beneficiaries continued to receive the grant in
cash (see Figure 1).8 BANSEFI’s distribution network expanded over time as a result of the partner-
ship with L@ Red de la Gente, and by 2009, it had reached nearly 2000 municipalities with 80 per
cent national coverage. The network specifically targeted rural and peri-urban localities with limited
access to financial services, which is where many POP beneficiaries live. The same year, BANSEFI
Table 1. Savings and remittance services by largest financial institutions in Mexico: figures in pesos of 2004 for
savings products
Savings Accounts Remittances
Bank
Required amount to
open account Minimum balance Administrative fees (annual)
Average fee
in dollars for
sending US
$300 from
the USa
BANSEFI and L@
Red de la Genteb
0 0 0 3–5
Banamex 500 Not required 10 + extra fee for savings
balance below 500
5.5–6.5
Banorte 750 750 required to
received interests
75 5.5–6.5
BBVA-Bancomer 750 750 182 5.5–6.5
HSBC 250 250 50 5.5–6.5
Scotiabank-Inverlat 500 Not required Not available 5.5–6.5
Banco Azteca 50 50 10 5.5–6.5
Source: Authors, based on PROFECO (2010).
Notes: aAverage depends on the location of transfer. Figures based on 21 intermediaries operating in the following cities:
Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Houston, Texas; Indianapolis, Indiana; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; New
York, New York; Sacramento, California; and San José, California; bBANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente work in
partnership with the following remittance companies: BTS, Dolex, Intermex, Giromex, Grupomex, Ria Financial,
Moneygram, Sigue, Transnetwork, Viamericas, and Western Union.
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and POP began a second phase, which consisted of issuing Visa debit cards to beneficiaries that were
already receiving POP in a savings account. This allowed POP beneficiaries to withdraw cash and
check account balances at ATMs. In addition, pre-paid cards with biometric technology were also
distributed, mainly among the rural poor who lived in localities with limited banking infrastructure.
By 2011, all POP beneficiaries in the country received their grants in savings accounts with debit or
prepaid cards (see Figure 1). This study focuses on the pilot phase specifically, that is the initial
transition from cash to electronic payments in savings accounts.9
4. Data and identification strategy
In 2004, BANSEFI and SAGARPA began the collection of a household panel survey in 25 of
Mexico’s 32 federal states. This happened in parallel with the pilot phase of POP electronic payment
system, which had started operating the year before, in 2003. The survey sampling frame was
designed to be representative of three regions: north, centre, and south, and of both users and non-
users of financial services. A sample of branches belonging to BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente
was randomly selected with a probability proportional to their number of clients (Woodruff, 2006).
Then, for each of the selected branches, between 20 and 30 households were randomly selected from
a listing of clients, while an equal number of households with no recorded use of formal financial
services in the previous five years to the survey were also included in the survey. The survey consists
of four rounds: 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. This gives us an overall sample of 3003 observations
corresponding to POP beneficiaries, who, between 2004 and 2007, received their income support
either in cash (1,197) or in a savings account (1,806).
For the identification strategy, we exploit the fact that the selection of households into the electronic
transfer programme was made by the managers of L@ Red de la Gente and POP and not the households
themselves. More specifically, programme enrolment was not optional for the household, the inclusion
into treatment was based on its proximity to a BANSEFI branch, or the nearest affiliate of L@ Red de la
Gente, generally within a radius of 10 kilometres. This identification strategy allowed us to rule out
household self-selection. However, the selection of branches into the electronic payments pilot was not
random and was influenced by specific factors, including the availability of financial infrastructure in
localities treated by POP and security. We exploited the variation in related observables to mitigate such
non-random placement and compute ATT matching estimators.10
It is important to note that in our sample, more than one branch exists per locality but only some
branches were selected for participation into the pilot. This means that branches did not univocally
identify treated localities. What is more, localities did not univocally identify household treatment
status.11 Specifically, in over a third of our sample, localities contained both treated and untreated
households (see Tables S15 to S17).12 This variation at both levels means that the Conditional
Independence Assumption (CIA) is not violated. Further sensitivity tests, which consisted of simulat-
ing a potential violation of the CIA (see Table S14), confirmed that that our results are robust to
potential confounding effects.
5. Outcomes
Given the data requirements of matching estimations, we employ the pooled sample over the four
available years. Since we are interested in the treatment effects of the electronic payments on savings
decisions, transaction costs, and risk management decisions, we considered four outcome variables:
the first is a binary variable, tandas, taking the value of one for households that participate in
informal rotating saving associations (ROSCAs), known in Mexico as tandas. Only slightly more
than 10 per cent of our sample used tandas in the 12 months prior to the survey. This is explained by
the socio-economic profile of the sampled households. Theft risks and budget constraints are likely
factors underpinning the low participation of POP beneficiaries in tandas, which require a
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commitment to a fixed sum of money for a given period. Homesavings is a binary indicator that takes
the value one if the household keeps part or its entire savings at home. Table S1 shows that, on
average, 30 per cent of the households kept money at home in the 12 months prior to the survey.
Remittances measures the frequency with which households receive remittances during the year.
ShockCoping is a binary indicator recording whether a household has used its own savings to cope
with idiosyncratic shocks; 15 per cent of the sample reported having used their savings as a coping
strategy. Idiosyncratic shocks include calamities associated with injuries, illness, or death of a household
member, the job loss experienced by a household member, a drop in either the price or the quantity of the
produce sold by the household, and the loss or damage of tools and machinery used for economic activity.
6. Methodology
We begin our exposition by considering a simple linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model, in which
control variables along with the impact variable are regressed on the outcomes of interest. The OLS
specification takes the form:
yi ¼ αþ Diβþ Xiγþ εi (1)
where Di is a dummy variable taking the value of one for households receiving POP through
electronic payments and zero for households receiving the grant in cash, whereas Xi is a vector of
household- and location-level characteristics as described in Table S1. OLS estimates would simply
compare average outcomes between treatment and control groups after controlling for the effect of
covariates. Shortcomings of this approach arise from model misspecification as well as from the risk
of overlooking the potential effect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity affecting the outcomes
of interest. A partial step towards addressing observable heterogeneity is the estimation of a fully
interacted linear model (FILM), which relaxes the homogeneity assumption and allows for interac-
tions of all control variables with the treatment status. If statistically significant interaction terms are
found, impact heterogeneity can be regarded as an issue. In such cases, only comparable individuals
should be considered to estimate treatment effects. For that purpose, matching estimators based on
the propensity score or other distance metrics can be used to construct a synthetic quasi-experimental
counterfactual. More formally, if we let yi1 denote the outcome of household i when treatment occurs
(Di ¼ 1Þ and yi0 the outcome of a control household, ( Di ¼ 0), the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) corresponds to y1  y0, where each outcome is averaged over the respective popula-
tion. Under such a setting, the vector of covariates in X allows us to balance the distribution of those
determinants across treated and control groups using matching estimation methods.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that this can be achieved bymatching directly on the covariates, or
by matching on the propensity score, which is calculated as the probability of treatment given a set of X
covariates. They indicate that while propensity score methods provide the coarsest balancing score,
covariate matching provides the finest. Zhao (2004) points out, however, that the latter approach is
impractical when there are many covariates and a metric is needed to combine them into a scalar.
A metric often adopted for its desirable properties is the Mahalanobis distance metric, which
minimises the distance between treated unit i and control unit j as follows:
d i; jð ÞM ¼ Xik  Xjk
 0
D1 Xik  Xjk
 
(2)
where X identifies k matching covariates andD1 is the variance covariance matrix of X . TheMahalanobis
metric assigns weights to each co-ordinate of X in inverse proportion to the variance of that co-ordinate, so
that the control unit with the minimum distance d i; jð ÞM is chosen as a match for each treated unit. The
estimation is only performed within the boundaries of the common support region, defined as the region
within which comparable treatment and control units lie, so that the ATT corresponds to:
8 S. Masino & M. Niño-Zarazúa
ATT ¼ E y1 T ¼ 1; d i; jð ÞM E ½y0
 T ¼ 0; d i; jð ÞM
 
(3)
or
ATT ¼ E½y1  y0jd i; jð ÞM  (4)
In order to test for the sensitivity of our results, three different matching algorithms are presented in
Tables 3–5, where standard errors are calculated according to Abadie and Imbens’ (2006) analytical
asymptotic variance method. The first set of results is that of a nearest neighbour matching estimation
in which treated observations are only matched to the closest untreated neighbour (Cochran & Rubin,
1973). Results are also presented for a kernel-based matching, where a weighting structure is imposed
over the whole data distribution to estimate the counterfactual. We calibrate caliper and bandwidth
restrictions according to the bias reduction performance measured as in Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
In all instances, we choose the least restrictive caliper and bandwidth which allow us to get rid of all
bias. The last set of results presented in Tables 3–5 use the nearest neighbour bias-adjusted Abadie
and Imbens (2011) estimator. Here, the distance metric corresponds to:
d i; jð ÞAI ¼ Xik  Xij
 
diagðD1Þ Xik  Xij
 
(5)
This metric is similar to the Mahalanobis distance, except for the weighting matrix adopted. In fact,
d i; jð ÞAI is weighted by a diagonal matrix, with the inverse of the variances of the X ’s as its elements.
The bias-correction algorithm proposed in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004) and Abadie and
Imbens (2011) allows us to overcome the finite sample bias deriving from non-exact matching. The
correction adjusts the difference between the matches with the differences in their covariate values,
without affecting the asymptotic variance. We use a propensity score-based adjustment. In addition to
this, to improve overlap, we follow Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2009) and Abadie and Imbens
(2011) and restrict the matching region to the subset of observations with 0:1<p Zð Þ<0:9; where p Zð Þ
denotes the propensity score. Crump et al. (2009) calculate the percentage propensity score distribu-
tion (α) to be dropped according to a condition based on the marginal distribution of the propensity
score. They establish a rule of thumb for the parameter α to be fixed at 0.1.
To address local-level heterogeneity, we first include all covariates for which a statistically
significant difference between treatment and control groups exists. This includes the geographical
location variables and the rural/urban location identifier. Second, we separate rural from urban
localities and re-estimate the model by matching only households within each area separately. As
explained in List, Millimet, Fredriksson, and McHone (2003), this is the matching analogy to the
fixed effects estimator, which removes any location-related unobservable not already controlled for
by the distance metric. In addition, such estimator satisfies an important condition set out in Smith
and Todd (2005), namely, that, for treated and non-treated units to be comparable they should reside
in the same local markets. Once this further condition is imposed, the ATT in Equation (5) becomes:
ATT ¼ E y1 T ¼ 1; d i; jð ÞM ; loc E ½y0
 T ¼ 0; d i; jð ÞM ; loc
 
(6)
or
ATI ¼ E½y1  y0jd i; jð ÞM; loc (7)
where loc corresponds to the rural-urban identifier.
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7. Results
Based on both the baseline balance of covariates and the FILM estimators, we observe significant
heterogeneity in covariates along the rural versus urban dimension as well as according to regional
patterns, age of household head, dependency ratios, and whether or not household heads speak an
indigenous language (see Sections 1 and 2 and Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Materials). In
order to address such heterogeneity, we rely on a Mahalanobis distance metric approach to identify
households with similar treatment probabilities, conditional on a set of covariates capturing such
heterogeneity. Table 2 presents the results from the probit estimation. The findings broadly conform
to our expectations in terms of significance and direction.
Tables 3–5 present, for each outcome, the results obtained with the different matching algorithms
described in Section 5. In Table 3, the whole sample is considered, while in Tables 4 and 5, the fixed
effect matching estimators are presented. Details of the balancing of the covariate distribution in the
treated and control groups, and of the overall mean bias reduction are presented in Tables S3–S6.
Starting with Table 3, matching on the whole sample indicates that electronic payments of POP
decrease the propensity to participate in tandas by between 3.3 and 4.8 per cent, depending on the
estimator. By forcing enrolment, the electronic payments seem to have acted as an incentive device
that increased the exposure to, and then utilisation of, formal savings. In addition, the pilot also
improved information about financial services by requiring regular visits to the programme branches,
while tandas entail high opportunity and financial costs – both in terms of time allocation and peer-
monitoring of savings groups – and risk of theft or losing the funds.13 Interestingly, the propensity to
save at home, which is our second outcome of interest, is not affected by the treatment. This
reinforces our point on transaction costs: the possibility of saving in a bank account provides a
desirable alternative to informal savings when transaction costs are high. However, when transaction
costs are minimal, as in the case of keeping money ‘under the mattress’, no substitution takes place.
Our findings are in line with those of Aportela (1999) who reports insignificant crowding out effects
from the expansion of PAHNAL on home savings in Mexico.
The magnitude of the substitution effect between saving portfolio choices is, however, small and it
increases when the sample of urban beneficiaries is considered on its own. This is due to the fact that
in Mexico, participation in tandas is higher among urban dwellers. Indeed, Klaehn, Helms, and
Deshpande (2006), Campos (1998), and Mansell Carstens (1995), among others, found that in urban
contexts with monetised markets, poor households have liquidity requirements for consumption and
production that often lead to a higher propensity to save in tandas and other informal sources of
savings and credit. In contrast, the rural poor exhibit higher preferences for saving in livestock,
agricultural inputs, building materials, and other tangibles over liquid assets. While this reflects the
risk portfolios of the rural poor, it could also reflect the multiplicity of specific benefits that
participation in tandas brings to them. These may range from positive signalling in this type of
trust interactions in tightly knit communities, to improving fragmented information and enhancing
inclusion. In view of these elements, rural participation in tandas would be expected to be relatively
unaffected by formal savings, which is also in line with the results of Jack and Suri (2014).14
It must be noted that, due to data limitations, we cannot disregard the possibility of other potential
channels that drive the substitution effect between savings accounts and tandas. It may be the case
that intra-household dynamics also influenced savings decisions. Administrative data reported in
González Rosas (2008) indicates that the median savings account balance among POP beneficiaries
at the end of the pilot was about 22.40 USD, more than twice that observed among non-POP users of
BANSEFI saving products. This is relevant since 96 per cent of POP beneficiaries are women.
Previous studies have underscored the role of savings accounts in enabling women to hide income
from family members and neighbours, particularly in rural settings (Dupas & Robinson, 2013, Jakiela
& Ozier, 2015). Thus, the benefits of anonymity from savings accounts may well be outweighing the
benefits of tandas (Anderson & Baland, 2002; Gugerty, 2007), although we cannot confirm this
transmission channel empirically.
10 S. Masino & M. Niño-Zarazúa
T
ab
le
2.
P
ro
bi
t
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
m
ar
gi
na
l
ef
fe
ct
s
T
an
da
H
om
e
S
av
in
g
R
em
it
ta
nc
es
S
ho
ck
C
op
in
g
T
an
da
H
om
e
S
av
in
g
R
em
it
ta
nc
es
S
ho
ck
C
op
in
g
T
an
da
H
om
e
S
av
in
g
R
em
it
ta
nc
es
S
ho
ck
C
op
in
g
W
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
U
rb
an
sa
m
pl
e
R
ur
al
sa
m
pl
e
L
oc
al
T
yp
e
.1
36
**
*
.1
38
**
*
.1
36
**
*
.1
07
**
(.
02
)
(.
02
)
(.
02
)
(.
04
5)
F
In
st
−
.1
11
**
*
−.
11
1*
**
−
.1
11
**
*
−
.1
28
*
−
.2
56
**
*
−
.2
56
**
*
−
.2
56
**
*
−
.2
87
**
*
−
.1
16
**
−
.1
17
**
−
.1
16
**
.0
44
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
75
)
(.
04
9)
(.
04
9)
(.
04
9)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.1
13
)
S
ou
th
_M
ex
ic
o
−
.3
36
**
*
−.
33
6*
**
−
.3
36
**
*
−
.3
36
**
*
−
.4
78
**
*
−
.4
78
**
*
−
.4
78
**
*
−
.6
42
**
*
−
.2
68
**
*
−
.2
68
**
*
−
.2
68
**
*
−.
18
4*
*
(.
02
5)
(.
02
5)
(.
02
5)
(.
05
9)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
42
)
(.
08
2)
(.
03
2)
(.
03
2)
(.
03
2)
(.
07
7)
C
en
tr
_M
ex
ic
o
−
.2
75
**
*
−.
27
6*
**
−
.2
75
**
*
−
.2
18
**
*
−
.4
77
**
*
−
.4
77
**
*
−
.4
77
**
*
−
.3
78
**
*
−
.1
92
**
*
−
.1
93
**
*
−
.1
92
**
*
−.
15
7*
(.
03
1)
(.
03
1)
(.
03
1)
(.
06
6)
(.
05
4)
(.
05
4)
(.
05
4)
(.
11
4)
(.
03
8)
(.
03
8)
(.
03
8)
(.
08
4)
H
ou
se
F
lo
or
.1
59
**
*
.1
59
**
*
.1
59
**
*
.1
35
**
.1
37
**
*
.1
36
**
*
.1
37
**
*
.2
81
**
*
.1
59
**
*
.1
74
**
*
.1
75
**
*
.0
95
(.
02
5)
(.
02
5)
(.
02
5)
(.
05
3)
(.
04
6)
(.
04
6)
(.
04
6)
(.
09
6)
(.
02
5)
(.
02
9)
(.
02
5)
(.
06
6)
P
ip
ed
W
at
er
.1
**
*
.1
01
**
*
.1
**
*
.1
11
*
.0
53
.0
54
.0
53
.1
.1
**
*
.1
19
**
*
.1
17
**
*
.1
73
**
(.
02
7)
(.
02
7)
(.
02
7)
(.
06
1)
(.
05
)
(.
05
)
(.
05
)
(.
14
2)
(.
02
7)
(.
03
1)
(.
02
7)
(.
06
7)
D
ep
R
at
io
−
.0
43
**
*
−.
04
3*
**
−
.0
43
**
*
−
.0
11
−
.0
58
**
*
−
.0
58
**
*
−
.0
58
**
*
−
.0
63
−
.0
16
−
.0
16
−
.0
16
.0
15
(.
01
1)
(.
01
1)
(.
01
1)
(.
02
4)
(.
01
6)
(.
01
6)
(.
01
6)
(.
04
)
(.
01
5)
(.
01
5)
(.
01
5)
(.
03
2)
A
ge
.0
01
**
.0
01
*
.0
01
**
.0
01
.0
04
**
.0
04
**
.0
04
**
.0
05
*
.0
00
.0
00
.0
00
−.
00
2
(.
00
08
)
(.
00
08
)
(.
00
08
)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
3)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
1)
(.
00
2)
E
du
ca
ti
on
.0
71
**
*
.0
7*
*
.0
71
**
*
.0
03
.1
4*
**
.1
4*
**
.1
4*
**
.2
1*
*
.0
12
.0
12
.0
12
−.
1
(.
02
7)
(.
02
7)
(.
02
7)
(.
06
)
(.
04
4)
(.
04
4)
(.
04
4)
(.
10
3)
(.
03
6)
(.
03
6)
(.
03
6)
(.
08
)
Id
io
S
oc
k
−
.0
7*
**
−.
07
**
*
−
.0
7*
**
−
.1
**
−
.1
**
−
.1
**
−
.0
5*
−
.0
53
*
−
.0
55
*
(.
02
4)
(.
02
4)
(.
02
4)
(.
00
4)
(.
00
4)
(.
00
4)
(.
03
1)
(.
03
1)
(.
03
1)
In
di
ge
no
us
.2
45
**
*
.2
45
**
*
.2
45
**
*
.1
9*
**
.1
64
**
*
.1
66
**
*
.1
64
**
*
.3
**
*
.2
9*
**
.2
9*
**
.2
9*
**
.1
62
**
*
(.
02
2)
(.
02
2)
(.
02
2)
(.
05
)
(.
04
)
(.
04
)
(.
04
)
(.
09
)
(.
02
6)
(.
02
6)
(.
02
6)
(.
06
3)
O
bs
.
26
94
26
91
26
94
56
6
10
24
10
23
10
24
22
3
16
70
16
68
16
70
34
3
L
R
χ2
37
8.
38
37
9.
37
37
8.
38
61
.0
5
22
5.
03
22
4.
94
22
5.
03
63
.8
5
20
5.
1
20
4.
95
20
5.
1
24
.9
5
p
>
χ2
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
P
su
ed
o
R
2
0.
10
1
0.
10
2
0.
10
1
0.
07
8
0.
16
4
0.
16
4
0.
16
4
0.
20
7
0.
08
8
0.
08
8
0.
08
8
0.
05
3
N
ot
es
:
*S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
10
pe
r
ce
nt
;
**
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
at
5
pe
r
ce
nt
;
**
*s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
1
pe
r
ce
nt
.
Improving financial inclusion through the delivery of CCTs 11
The third outcome of interest is the frequency of remittance reception, which for the full sample is
not influenced by POP’s savings accounts (see Table 3). However, when we computed the fixed
effects estimators, the results turn out to be positive for rural households (see Table 5). As the
frequency of remittance reception is expressed in log-form, we take the antilog of the ATT coeffi-
cients and compute eγ  1ð Þ  100 as in Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), which calculates the
percentage change of the median of remittance reception of treatment households relative to the
control group. Two of the three matching algorithms indicate that the frequency of remittance
reception increases by 90 per cent in the rural sector. To gauge the extent of the impact, consider
the hypothetical case of a household i that receives remittances six times a year before the interven-
tion. Following the opening of savings accounts, the same household would be able to receive
remittances on a monthly basis.15
We highlight several plausible channels underpinning our results. First, improved information:
since POP grants are paid regularly, recipients were forced to visit programme branches at least
fortnightly. By doing so, they received regular exposure to information on other financial services,
including remittances. Second, reduced transaction costs: BANSEFI and non-banking institutions
affiliated to L@ Red de la Gente achieved a very extensive territorial coverage, specifically targeting
localities with limited or no access to banking services. Therefore, travelling distance to programme
branches is much lower than to other remittance companies which usually operate only in municipal
capitals. Third, lower prices: POP’s savings accounts were provided free of opening and maintenance
Table 3. Mahalanobis distance metric and bias-adjusted nearest neighbour matching estimators
Tanda Home Saving Remittances Shock Coping
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
ATT −0.048** −0.033* −0.046** −0.05 −0.031 −0.053 0.114 0.03 0.106 0.08** 0.08** 0.06*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.02) (0.035) (0.238) (0.16) (0.129) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033)
Obs. 2456 2456 2456 2454 2454 2454 2456 2456 2456 510 510 510
Treated 1200 1097 1399 1198 1095 1099 1200 1200 1413 224 224 264
Controls 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 1043 246 246 246
Comm
Supp
2243 2140 2442 2241 2138 2052 2243 2243 2456 470 470 510
Off sup 213 316 14 213 316 402 213 213 0 40 40 0
Notes: Abadie and Imbens’ (2006) heteroskedasticity-robust analytical standard errors are reported in parenth-
eses. *Significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.
Table 4. Mahalanobis distance metric and bias-adjusted nearest neighbour matching estimators (urban sector)
Tanda Home Saving Remittances Shock Coping
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
NN
mahal
Kernel
weighted
NN
bias_adj
ATT −0.1* −0.077* −0.14*** −0.026 −0.016 −0.071 −0.712 −0.485 −0.427 0.036 0.024 0.024
(0.053) (0.046) (0.05) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.49) (0.3) (0.26) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062)
Obs. 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 896 196 196 196
Treated 456 433 466 456 433 467 444 444 346 83 87 107
Controls 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 78 78 78
Comm
Supp
749 717 759 749 717 759 737 717 639 161 175 175
Off sup 147 170 137 147 170 136 159 159 257 35 21 11
Notes: Abadie and Imbens (2006)’s heteroskedasticity-robust analytical standard errors are reported in parenth-
eses. *Significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.
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fees, they did not require a minimum savings balance and allowed POP beneficiaries to receive
deposits from other sources, including remittances. Remittance services are particularly competitive,
as the fee charged by BANSEFI and L@ Red de la Gente corresponds to one-half the average market
price offered by other remittance providers (see Table 1). Fourth: improved security may have also
played a role here, as the transition from cash to electronic payments is likely to have reduced crime
rates associated with theft and assault (Klein & Mayer, 2011; Wright et al., 2014), which in turn
positively impacts remittance behaviour (Coon, 2015, Vargas-Silva, 2009).
Finally, we find in Table 3 that households who received POP in a bank account were 6–8 per cent
more likely to use their savings to cope with idiosyncratic shocks. The increased reliance on savings
implies that resorting to contracting loans or reducing consumption become less frequent. Karlan,
McConnell, Mullainathan, and Zinman (2011) point out that, when unexpected events arise, failure to
smooth consumption as a consequence of inadequate financial planning can result in households
resorting to contracting new debt or defaulting on existing loans. These are undesirable conse-
quences, particularly when considering that, for POP beneficiaries who live near the subsistence
level, any reduction in consumption can drastically impact health status, schooling, work productiv-
ity, and also future consumption and income levels.
Furthermore, as social and financial sanctions usually accompany loan defaults, the improved
portfolio of copying strategies is a desirable result of electronic payments. Administrative data on the
balance of savings among POP’s beneficiaries (see González Rosas, 2008) suggest that the shift from
debt accumulation and cuts in consumption to usage of savings reflects an increase in the levels of
savings, which in turn may be partly attributed, at least in the rural context as we discuss below, to
increases in the frequency of remittances reception. The impact is concentrated in the rural sector, as
visible in Table 5, where better and more frequent access to remittances, coupled with the certainty of
regular, predictable, and reliable income transfers from POP, represented an incentive mechanism
generated by the programme. This, together with the fact that the programme effectively forced
regular use of savings accounts, enabled the poor to better diversify their risk management portfolios.
Our results are in line with those of Jack and Suri (2014) who report that the availability of a mobile-
based transaction system in Kenya translated into consumption smoothing in times of income shocks,
through an increased remittances channel. The absence of significant impacts in urban areas may
reflect the higher incidence of idiosyncratic shocks in rural areas as indicated by the sample size
differential. This may also reflect a more pronounced effect on households that were more economic-
ally disadvantaged to begin with.
In order to verify the robustness of our results, we conducted several tests of impact heterogeneity
and we also checked for potential CIA violations due to non-random placement of programme
branches, by applying the test developed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008). Due to space
limitations, we present these results in the Supplementary Materials. In all instances, outcomes are
remarkably stable, which indicate that unobservable factors do not pose a threat to our results.
Nevertheless, due to the nature of our data, our results should be taken with caution when considering
the policy implications of our findings.
8. Conclusions
This study examined the effect of the initial phase of the electronic payment system of POP. This is
relevant as the transition from cash payments to savings accounts represented, for most POP
beneficiaries, the first direct encounter with a formal financial institution.
We found that the programme produced positive effects, although with a degree of impact
heterogeneity between rural and urban areas. Access to savings accounts led to a reduction in the
rate of participation in tandas in urban areas, where participation is more recurrent in the context of
Mexico. The incentives that the electronic payments generated for the utilisation of savings accounts,
combined with the transaction costs tandas entail in terms of peer-monitoring, organisation effort, and
risks of theft, are the most likely underlying transmission mechanisms explaining the substitution
Improving financial inclusion through the delivery of CCTs 13
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effect between formal and informal savings; although we cannot rule out the possibility that intra-
household dynamics also influenced savings decisions.
In addition, by forcing regular visits to programme branches, POP’s electronic payments increased
households’ exposure to other formal financial services that are vital to accumulating assets and
improving their risk management portfolios. Specifically, the intervention improved information on
remittance services, reduced associated transaction costs and service fees, possibly improved security
and consequently increased the frequency of remittances reception. This, in turn, contributed to
smoothing consumption and mitigating the catastrophic effects of income shocks. Moreover, the fact
that treated households were more likely to resort to their own savings as a shock coping strategy is in
itself a desirable outcome of the intervention.
Our findings have clear implications for policy, especially at a time when other cash transfer
programmes around the world are undertaking the transition from cash to electronic payments. Firstly,
our study underscores the potential welfare benefits from public-private alliances. Moreover, we show
that, beyond their intended objectives, cash transfer programmes can also contribute to improving
financial inclusion among the poor. However, to achieve this target, simply extending access to financial
services will not be enough. Providing incentives to get people to gain exposure to, and use a broader
spectrum of financial services is crucial. Further research is needed to improve our understanding of the
longer-term and second-order effects of electronic payments in the context of cash transfer programmes,
and of their link to other financial services such as insurance and credit.
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Notes
1. We refer to ‘urban’ areas in contexts of peri-urban and marginalised neighbourhoods. It is, therefore, not uncommon to
observe ‘urban’ dwellers living in houses without concrete floor or walls. See Bazán et al. (2005) for further details.
2. Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman (2009) report that only 25 per cent of cash transfer programmes worldwide are distributed
through electronic payments that are inclusive in terms of improved accessibility to financial services.
3. For a comprehensive review of this strand of the literature, see Prina (2015).
4. Migrant workers, 25 per cent of which were poor, sent in 2015 nearly US $25 billion to their families in Mexico, which
contributed to 2.3 per cent of the country’s GDP.
5. Non-banking institutions in Mexico include credit unions, savings and credit associations (SCAs), savings and credit co-
operatives (SACCOs), and microfinance institutions. Credit unions have formally operated in Mexico since the creation of
the National Banking Commission in 1924. Their original objective was to form syndicates of producers and small firms
to distribute direct credits and technical assistance from development banks and other governmental agencies. SCAs are
non-profit organisations with open membership. As in the case of credit unions, financial operations within SCAs are
constrained to receive deposits and give credits to their members. SACCOs are organisations that operate under a set of
simple principles: i) one person, one vote; ii) no returns on capital, and iii) the use of profits for social purposes. SCAs as
well as SACCOSs usually operate in rural and peri-urban areas.
6. Indeed, in our sample, only 17.5 per cent of Oportunidades beneficiaries reported having had savings accounts prior to the
BANSEFI electronic transfer programme.
7. When transfers had to be collected in cash at the nearest distribution point, the figures for rural beneficiaries indicated an
average time allocation of four hours, corresponding to an opportunity cost of 17 pesos, and an average travelling expense
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of 30 pesos. These costs go down to half an hour of time allocation, corresponding to an opportunity cost of 2.22 pesos,
and 0.5 pesos for travelling expenses, on average, after the pilot implementation.
8. It is important to note that, while programme branches were in many cases already physically accessible to Oportunidades
beneficiaries, a very small fraction of these households reported having had a savings account prior to the introduction of
the BANSEFI account. In Mexico, as in many other contexts, the utilisation of financial services is not strictly contingent
upon access. There are other entry barriers, including limited information and lack of trust in financial institutions. In fact,
lack of trust has been reported as an important reason explaining why the poor do not use formal financial services (see
Dupas et al., 2016; Mehrotra, Vandewalle, & Somville, 2016, Osili & Paulson, 2014). Thus, by forcing enrolment, the
intervention mitigated these entry barriers into the formal financial sector.
9. For an analysis of the second phase, that is the inclusion of Visa debit cards to the existing savings accounts, see Bachas et
al. (2017).
10. While using information at locality and household level imperfectly controls for branch characteristics, we find that nearly
60 per cent of the probability of being treated is explained by the covariates used in the matching estimators (see Table S18
in the Supplementary Material).
11. The Oportunidades sample is relatively homogeneous due to the targeting method adopted by the programme, which relies
on the marginality index and the proxy-means test to identify the poor eligible to receive Oportunidades.
12. Tables numbered after an S are available in the Supplementary Materials.
13. Earlier studies have highlighted the risks associated with ROSCAs participation, particularly for the poor and vulnerable
(see Vonderlack & Schreiner, 2002; Wright & Muteesassira, 2001).
14. We thank one of the referees for bringing this point to our attention.
15. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we were unable to assess whether the size of remittances changed over time.
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